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Supermax’s Kryptonite? Wilkinson v. Austin:
The Due Process Challenge to Ohio’s
Super-Maximum Security Prison
ADAM MILLER
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

he most dangerous criminals in the United States are
housed across the nation in highly restrictive and extremely
isolated super-maximum security prisons known as Supermax
prisons.1 Society’s most notorious and feared villains
including Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber), Terry
Nichols (conspirator in the Oklahoma City bombing), Lee
Boyd Malvo (conspirator in the 2002 Beltway sniper attacks),
John Allen Muhammed (implementer of the Beltway sniper
attacks), and Eric Robert Rudolph (implementer of the 1996
Centennial Olympic Park bombing) are all imprisoned
indefinitely in a Supermax prison.2 The recent increase in
prison population and difficulty in preventing prison violence
has resulted in the widespread use of Supermax facilities.3
1

See generally Chase Riveland, Supermax Prisons: Overview and
General Considerations, U.S.Dept. of Justice, National Institute of
Corrections, Jan. 1999, available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/
1999/014937.pdf (explicating Supermax prisons remove prisoners who
are assaultive or violent, attempting to escape, preying on other inmates,
or exhibiting disruptive behavior from general population).
2
See generally Supermax Prisons and the Constitution: Liability
Concerns in the Extended Control Unit, National Institute of Corrections,
Nov. 2004; See also, Wikipedia, Supermax, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Supermax_prison (noting Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber), Terry
Nichols (conspirator in the Oklahoma City bombing), Lee Boyd Malvo
(conspirator in the 2002 Beltway sniper attacks), John Allen Muhammed
(implementer of the Beltway sniper attacks), and Eric Robert Rudolph
(implementer of 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing) are imprisoned
in Supermax prison).
3
See Charles A. Pettigrew, Technology and the Eighth Amendment:
The Problem of Supermax Prisons, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 191, 191-92
(2002) (noting that the United States, one of the world’s largest
incarcerators, leads in development of state of the art, Supermax prisons,
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The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports, at the end of
2003, 6.9 million people were under correctional supervision
in the United States, almost a three hundred percent increase
since 1980.4
The dramatic increase in correctional
populations has resulted in widespread prison crowding,
forcing most correctional facilities to operate above their
designed capacity.5 The overcrowding of prisons, the
“toughening” of the inmate population, and the increase in
gang activity have made it difficult for corrections
administrators to maintain order.6 In response to the
with one figure putting the number of Supermax prisoners between
25,000 and 100,000).
4
See U.S. Dept. of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003,
Correctional
Populations
Chart,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
glance/tables/corr2tab.htm (showing three hundred percent increase in
correctional supervision from 1,842,100 persons under correction
supervision in 1980 to 6,924,500 persons in 2003); See, e.g., Prison
Reform Advocacy Center, Critical Facts about the Nations Prisons,
http://www.prisonreform.com/usprison_main.shtml (“the three strikes
laws—mandating that any person convicted of three felonies must be
sentenced to life without parole, proposes to end or severely limit parole,
escalation of the war on drugs, mandatory minimum sentencing for nonviolent crimes, and increased federalization of certain categories of
crimes” all contributed to the dramatic growth in prison population. Id.);
See also Riveland, supra note 1, at 5 (reporting that National Institute of
Corrections attributes increased prison crowding partly to “increase in
street gang members, drug offenders, mentally ill, and youthful offenders”
Id.).
5
See Correctional Populations Chart, supra note 4 (indicating increase
of over 5 million people under correctional supervision from 1980 to
2003). Prison crowding has forced correctional administrators to house
and manage far more offenders than their facilities are designed to hold
with fewer staff than needed to manage the institutions safely and
humanely. Crowding creates severe management problems for state and
local officials. See also Policy: Options for Addressing Prison Crowding,
National Criminal Justice Association, (July 22, 2003) (detailing how
prison populations have reached historic high levels).
6
See Riveland, supra note 1, at 7 (reporting use of such facilities
allows for the correctional use of “dispersion” to handle troublesome
inmates) (Corrections officials have defended the need for such facilities
based on the perceived toughening of the inmate population, increased
gang activity, the difficulty of maintaining order in severely crowded
prisons, and from experience gained over time that suggests such units are
beneficial.).
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increasing difficulties to maintain inmate control,
jurisdictions throughout the nation have built Supermax
facilities as highly restrictive and state of the art security
prisons.7
Due to the harsh and restrictive conditions within
Supermax prisons, various questions have been raised
regarding the constitutionality of the facilities.8 Wilkinson v.
7

In recent years, prison administrators have placed persons exhibiting
disruptive behaviors into separate housing units. This “concentration”
approach creates specific units or facilities to manage this troublesome
type of inmate in a high-security environment, generally isolated from all
other inmates. The premise is that general population prisons will be
more easily and safely managed if the troublemakers are completely
removed. See id. at 1. (explicating that this approach allows for dispersal
of problem inmates and prevents them from uniting in their misconduct
by enabled prison officials to break up cliques and gangs); see also
Human Rights Watch, Supermax Prisons: An Overview,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/supermax/Sprmx002.htm#P40391
(claiming exploding prison populations, meager budgets, and punitive
political climates have overwhelmed corrections professional’s ability to
operate safe, secure, and humane facilities resulting in administrator’s use
of prolonged supermax confinement in effort to increase their control over
prisoners).
8
See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(The District Court for the Northern District of California reviewed
allegations that California’s Pelican Bay State Prison’s Security Housing
Unit [SHU], a Supermax facility, “imposed inhumane conditions” on its
mentally ill inmates. The court determined that the conditions within the
Supermax prison created a level of cruelty that violated the mentally ill
inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. The Court found the conditions of
confinement in SHU resulted in severe isolation of inmates which
inflicted serious mental injury to inmates. Not all inmates in the SHU
were found to be sufficiently at risk of developing serious mental health
problems as a result of their confinement. Those inmates who
demonstrated a “particularly high risk for suffering very serious or severe
injury to their mental health” id., were removed from incarceration in the
SHU.); See also Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis.
2001) (The Court held that the extreme isolation and solitary nature of
Supermax prisons inflicts unconstitutional hardship on mentally ill
inmates. The court determined that there was sufficient evidence to find
that both the objective and subjective components of the Eighth
Amendment’s analysis were met, granting an injunction prohibiting
mentally ill inmates from being housed in Wisconsin’s Supermax
facility.).
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Austin is the most recent constitutional challenge of
Supermax prisons to reach the United States Supreme Court.9
In Wilkinson, the Court reviewed allegations that the inmate
selection process for the Ohio State Penitentiary [hereinafter
“OSP”], a Supermax facility, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.10 The Court unanimously
held that, although inmates of OSP have a protected liberty
interest in avoiding assignment to the facility, the procedures
set forth in Ohio’s new policy dictating the inmate selection
process satisfied the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment.11
This note discusses the Supreme Court’s holding in
Wilkinson that OSP’s system for inmate placement in its
Supermax facility does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.12 Part II will summarize OSP’s purpose and
condition, and will focus on Ohio’s New Policy regarding
inmate placement.13 Part III will examine Supreme Court
precedent and the Court’s conclusions of law in determining
whether inmates have a protected liberty interest in avoiding
assignment to OSP and the due process implications of the
inmate selection process to OSP.14 Part IV will question the
Supreme Court’s disregard of the adverse mental effects in
inmates subjected to the extreme isolation conditions within
Supermax prisons.15 Finally, Part V will analyze the likely
impact of the Wilkinson decision on other jurisdictions in
their development of fair inmate placement procedures for
their Supermax facilities.16

9

See infra notes 88-96, 100-104, 107-120 and accompanying text
(discussing Wilkinson v. Austin Supreme Court decision).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
See infra notes 18-68 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 96-127 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 67-123 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 124-149 and accompanying text.
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OHIO STATE PENITENTIARY: A SUPERMAX
FACILITY

As a result of a 1993 riot at the Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility, Ohio’s first and only supermax prison
was opened in Youngstown in April of 1998.17 OSP has the
capability of housing 504 male inmates in single occupancy
cells and is designed to separate the “most predatory and
dangerous prisoners” from the rest of Ohio’s general prisoner
population.18 The following section serves as background for
the overall purpose of supermax prisons as well as the
placement procedures and environmental conditions of OSP
specifically.19
A. Purpose of Supermax Prisons
Supermax facilities are intended to house and control the
“worst of the worst.”20 These facilities are maximum17

See Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, OSP
Inspection Report, Jan. 29, 2004, http://www.ciic.state.oh.us/
reports/osp.pdf [hereinafter OSP Inspection Report] (detailing that OSP, a
$65 million project, was reported to have been a “vision” in response to
the Lucasville riot); See also Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, The Institutions, http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/prisprog.htm
(outlining OSP’s annual operating budget of $28,595,868).
18
See Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Institution
Information: Ohio State Penitentiary, http://www.drc.state/oh.us/
Public/osp.htm (describing OSP’s facility mission is “to protect Ohio’s
citizens, employees, and inmates by confining those inmates who pose a
threat to staff, other inmates, or institutional security in a controlled
setting that is conducive to self-improvement” Id.). See id. (graphical
display of OSP’s population, racial distribution and institutional
information, detailing 454 inmates were incarcerated in OSP as of
September 2005).
19
See infra notes 20-70 and accompanying text.
20
See Supermax prisons and the Constitution, supra note 2 (claiming
Supermax prisons are designed to controlling the most dangerous,
recalcitrant, aggressive, and antagonistic inmates in a prison); See e.g.
Wikipedia, Supermax, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supermax_prison
(claiming notable inmates currently incarcerated in Supermax facilities
include: Terry Nichols, Theodore Kaczynski, Lee Boyd Malvo, John
Allen Muhammed, and Eric Robert Rudolph.).
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security prisons with highly restrictive conditions designed to
segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the general
prison population.21 The National Institute of Corrections
defines Supermax prisons as correctional facilities “that
provide for the management and secure control of inmates
who have been officially designated as exhibiting violent or
seriously disruptive behavior while incarcerated.”22 The
inmates in OSP are a “threat to safety and security in
traditional high-security facilities and their behavior can only
be controlled by separation, restrictive movement, and
limited access to staff and other inmates.”23 The use of
Supermax facilities has increased over the last twenty years,
in response to the rise in the amount of prison gangs and
prison violence.24 By isolating the penitentiary system’s
most violent prisoners, supermax prisons are intended to
ensure the safety of the guards and other prisoners and to
produce “behavioral modification” within the inmates.25
21

See Pettigrew, supra note 3, at 193 (describing Supermax prisons
as “highly restrictive, high-custody housing unit within a secure facility,
or an entire secure facility, that isolates inmates from the general prison
population and from each other due to grievous crimes, repetitive
assaultive or violent institutional behavior, the threat of escape or actual
escape from high-custody facility(s), or inciting or threatening to incite
disturbances in a correctional institution” Id.)
22
Riveland, supra note 1, at 3. Prisons have historically had “jails
within prisons.” Simply because people are in the controlled environment
of a prison does not stop some of them from being assaultive or violent,
attempting to escape, inciting disturbances, preying on weaker inmates, or
otherwise exhibiting disruptive behavior. Such people must be removed
from the general population of the prison environment while they threaten
any of those behaviors. See id. at 7 (explicating that order and safety are
priority objectives of any correctional facility).
23
See id. at 9.
24
See Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2389 (2005) (citing
Riveland, supra note 1, at 5) (claiming that most prisons across the
country have been operating at well over 100% of design capacity due to
increases in street gang members, drug offenders, mentally ill, and
youthful offenders).
25
See Jerry R. DeMaio, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Threat
of Overclassifcation in Wisconsin’s Supermax Prisons, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
207, 208 (2001) (claiming that the “purpose of a Supermax prison is
twofold: to help maintain order within the prison population as a whole
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Approximately thirty states now have supermax facilities in
operation.26
B. Placement Into OSP
When OSP opened, the procedures used to assign inmates
to the facility were inconsistent and undefined.27 For a time,
no official policy governing placement existed and inmates
were placed in the OSP based solely on warden
recommendations.28 In an attempt to establish consistent
guidelines for the selection and placement of inmates into
and to ensure the safety of inmates and staff” Id.); See also Alice Lynd,
What is a “Supermax” Prison?, The Spunk Press Archive, March 1996,
http://www.spunk.org/library/prison/sp001611.txt
(explicating
that
supermaxes are designed to house violent prisoners or prisoners who
might threaten security of the guards or other prisoners).
26
See Leena Kurki and Norval Morris, The Purpose, Practices, and
Problems of Supermax Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385, 387 (2001); See
also Joan Biskupic, High Court Upholds Ohio’s ‘Supermax’ Prison
Policy, USA TODAY (June 13, 2005) (finding that approximately 30 states
run highly restrictive “Supermax” facilities, and the federal government
operates two).
27
See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 2386 (determining that when OSP
first became operational, no official policy governing placement there was
in effect resulting in inconsistent and undefined procedures and haphazard
and erroneous placements); See also OSP Inspection Report, supra note
17 (explicating that OSP placement decisions were alleged to be arbitrary
and inconsistent, with near total discretion afforded to decision-makers
but the “department has since refined and improved upon policies and
practices to ensure due process, and to ensure that each level 5 placement
is necessary and appropriate” and finding that “haphazard placements
were not uncommon, and some individuals who did not pose highsecurity risks were designated, nonetheless, for OSP.” Id.).
28
Under the Old Policy, 111-07, the classification committee made
up of a deputy warden and a mental health professional from the inmate's
current institution, and a third official designated by the warden, would
receive a written statement from the prisoner as well as information
provided by staff, and make a recommendation to the warden. The
warden then approved or disapproved the recommendation, and sent the
information along to the Bureau of Classification. Even if both the
classification committee and the warden agreed that high-maximumsecurity classification was inappropriate for an inmate, the Chief of the
Bureau could still assign the inmate to OSP. See Austin v. Wilkinson,
372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Austin II].
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OSP, Ohio issued Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Corrections [hereinafter “ODRC”] Policy 111-07.29 This
policy has been revised and now contains two relevant
versions: the “Old Policy” and the “New Policy.”30 The
problems with inmate placement that persisted under the Old
Policy were corrected in the New Policy by providing more
guidance on OSP inmate selection and affording inmates
more procedural safeguards against erroneous and
undeserved OSP placement.31
Upon entering the correctional system, all Ohio inmates
are assigned a numerical security classification ranging from
level 1 through level 5, with 1 being the lowest security risk
and 5 the highest.32 This initial risk classification is based on
various factors including the nature of the underlying offense,
criminal history, and gang affiliation.33 The inmates sent to
29

See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (citing Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections Policy 111-07 (Aug. 31, 1998)).
30
See id. (indicating that the Old Policy took effect on January 28,
1999, but problems with the Old Policy lead to the creation of the New
Policy which took effect in early 2002).
31
See id. (declaring that the New Policy was promulgated after
forming a committee to study the matter and retaining a national expert in
prison security, resulting in the a policy that provided more guidance on
the factors to be considered in placement decisions and afforded inmates
more procedural protection against erroneous placement at OSP).
32
See Austin II, 372 F.3d at 350 (citing Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections Policy 53-CLS-01 § V and Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections Policy 111-07 § VI(B)–(D),
App. 125a–131a) (explicating that all prisoners in Ohio are assigned a
rating from Level 1 [lowest risk] to Level 5 [highest risk] based on a
predictive assessment of the likely security risk the prisoner presents
“based on a variety of characteristics about the prisoner’s offense, any
previous criminal conduct, his gang affiliation, etc” Id.); See also
Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (noting Level 5 inmates are placed in the
OSP and levels 1 through 4 inmates are placed at lower security facilities
throughout the State).
33
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (finding that a classification for
review for OSP placement can occur either (1) upon entry into the prison
system if the inmate was convicted of certain offenses or (2) during the
term of incarceration if an inmate engages in specified conduct); See also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (6th
Cir. 2004) (No. 04-495) available at http://docket.medill.northwestern.
edu/archives/002123.php (explaining that pursuant to ODRC Policy 111-
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OSP are those who fall into Classification Level 5, which is a
“security level for inmates who commit or lead others to
commit violent, disruptive, predatory, riotous actions, or who
otherwise pose a serious threat to the security of the
institution as set forth in the established Level 5 criteria.”34
This classification is subject to modification at any time
during the inmate's prison term if the inmate engages in any
misconduct that is deemed a security risk.35
07, the procedure for classifying inmates as Level 5 is triggered by: (1) an
independent finding that the inmate has committed a serious violation of
prison rules, or (2) the inmate’s conviction for a new crime committed
while in prison).
34
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (citing Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction 53-CLS-04; See also OSP Inspection
Report, supra note 17 (outlining Level 5 placement criteria) (The criteria
governing Level 5 placement considers:
(1) Whether the inmate has demonstrated physically or
sexually assaultive and/or predatory behavior resulting in
either serious physical injury or death to any person…; (2)
the nature of the criminal offense committed prior to
incarceration constitutes a current threat…; (3) the inmate
has lead, organized, or incited a serious disturbance or riot
that resulted in the taking of a hostage, significant property
damage, physical harm, or loss of life; (4) the inmate has
conspired or attempted to convey, introduce or possess
major contraband which poses a serious threat or danger to
the security of the institution…; (5) the inmate functions as a
leader, enforcer, or recruiter of a security threat group,
which is actively involved in violent or disruptive behavior;
(6) the inmate escaped, attempted to escape or committed
acts to facilitate an escape from a level three or four or
equivalent close or maximum security facility…; (7) the
inmate has demonstrated an ability to compromise the
integrity of staff, which resulted in a threat to the security of
the institution; (8) the inmate knowingly exposed others to
the risk of contracting a dangerous disease, such as HIV or
hepatitis; and (9) the inmate, through repetitive and/or
seriously disruptive behavior, has demonstrated a chronic
inability to adjust to level 4B as evidenced by repeated class
II rule violations. Id.
35
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d
346
(6th
Cir.
2004)
(No.
04-495)
available
at
http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/002123.php (defining how
although prisoners receive initial classification upon incarceration, that
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On an unannounced inspection of OSP in January 2004,
the placement of inmates, according to the offenses they were
convicted of, classified as level 5 were reported as follows:
Table 1.136
Reasons for Level 5 Placement

Percent

Serious Assault of an Inmate

29%

Serious Assault of an Employee

26%

Murder of an Inmate

23%

Murder of Employee

8%

Hostage/Kidnapping of Employee

7%

Rape of an Inmate

3%

Serious Escape related Offense

1%

Conspiracy to Murder Inmate

1%

Pre-Incarceration Offenses

1%

The New Policy provides inmates with more procedural
safeguards against erroneous and undeserved OSP placement
through the ODRC inmate review process.37 This protection
is initiated by a “Security Designation Long Form”
[hereinafter “Long Form”], which details the inmate's recent
violence, escape attempts, gang affiliation, underlying
offense, and other pertinent details.38 The New Policy
provides inmates with forty-eight hours notice of their
classification is subject to change at any point during prisoner’s term,
based on prison conduct).
36
See OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17.
37
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (declaring New Policy provides
more guidance on factors to be considered in placement decisions and
afforded inmates more procedural protection against erroneous placement
at OSP).
38
Id. (explicating review process begins when prison officials
prepare “Security Designation Long Form,” three-page form detailing
inmate recent violence, escape attempts, gang affiliation, underlying
offense, and other pertinent details).
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hearing, where a three-member committee will review the
inmate's proposed security classification level.39 Inmates are
provided with their Long Form in advance. They are then
permitted to attend the hearing and may submit a written
statement or offer any pertinent information, explanation,
and/or objection to their OSP placement.40
The committee must recommend placement and the
inmate’s current warden must approve the placement, for an
inmate to be placed in OSP.41 The inmate has fifteen days to
file an objection to their placement with the Bureau of
Classification, a body of Ohio prison officials vested with the
final decision making authority over all Ohio inmate
assignments.42 If any of these three administrative bodies
finds placement at the OSP inappropriate the process
terminates.43 If the Bureau approves the warden’s
recommendation, however, the inmate is transferred to

39

Id. (describing how three-member classification committee
convenes to review proposed classification and to hold hearings after
inmate receives at least forty-eight hours written notice of hearing,
summarizing the conduct or offense triggering placement review).
40
Id. (noting that inmates may not call witnesses); See also Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004)
(No. 04-495) available at http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu
/archives/002123.php, (citing Policy 111-07 § VI(C), App.127a–130a;
Notice of Hearing Form, App. 144a (explaining that inmates are permitted
to make written and oral submissions at hearing)).
41
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2390 (citing Policy 111-07 § VI(C),
App. 127–130a; Classification Committee Report Form, App. 144a
(requiring that if Committee does recommend OSP placement, it
documents decision on a “Classification Committee Report” setting forth
“the nature of the threat the inmate presents and the committee's reasons
for the recommendation,” as well as summary of any information
presented at hearing. Id.)).
42
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2391 (citing Policy 111-07 § VI(C),
App. 127a–130a (detailing that if Warden approves placement
recommendation, Warden forwards it to ODRC’s Bureau of Classification
for final approval but inmate has 15 days to file any objections with
Bureau of Classification)).
43
See id. at 2390 (finding if any one reviewer declines to recommend
OSP placement, process terminates).
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OSP.44 Inmates assigned to OSP receive another review
within the thirty days prior to their arrival.45 Designated OSP
staff members review the inmate’s file to determine if the
inmate's placement was appropriate.46 If the review board
finds the placement proper, then the inmate remains in OSP.47
After initial placement at OSP, the classification
committee notifies the inmates, at least twice a year, to
inform them of their progress toward security level
reduction.48 The committee must advise the inmate of any
specific conduct necessary for Level 5 classification
reduction, as well as the committee’s estimate of the amount
of time before the inmate’s security level is likely to be
reduced.49 The classification committee evaluates several
factors in accordance with ODRC policy 53-CLS-04, to
determine if an inmate’s reduction from Level 5 security
classification is appropriate.50
44

Id. at 2391 (explaining that if the Bureau of Classification deems
inmate is properly placed, inmate remains in OSP).
45
See id. (detailing how inmates assigned to OSP receive placement
review within 30 days of their arrival).
46
Id. (explaining that designated OSP staff member examine inmate
files to determine if placement was appropriate).
47
See id. (showing that If OSP staff member deems inmate is
inappropriately placed, the reviewer prepares written recommendation to
OSP warden that inmate be transferred to lower security institution).
48
See id. (citing ODRC Policy 53-CLS-04, mandating that “inmates
classified into Level 5B shall have an assessment completed every three
months; inmates classified as Level 5A shall have an assessment every six
months.” Id.).
49
The annual review focuses on a variety of factors that are
designed to allow a predictive assessment of the risk the prisoner presents
including: “the prisoner’s underlying criminal offense, the time left on his
sentence, the reasons for his Supermax placement, the time that has
elapsed since the incident prompting placement, his conduct at OSP, the
extent to which he has taken advantage of programming and his
interaction with staff.” Petition for Certiorari, Austin v. Wilkinson, 372
F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-495), available at
http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/002123.php (citing Policy
111-07 § VI(F), (H) & (I); Privilege/Security Level Review Form, App.
144a.).
50
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2391 (citing ODRC Policy 53-CLS04); See also OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17 (detailing
classification committee considerations in determining security
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C. Conditions at OSP
Supermax prisons are designed to exercise complete
control over inmates through social isolation and restricting
mobility.51 OSP inmates are subject to more restrictions than
prisoners at other Ohio correctional facilities, including those
in maximum-security prisons.52 OSP detains inmates in their

classification level reduction) In considering the reduction in security
classification level, the classification committee will consider:
Reason for placement in Level 4 or 5 and relevant
circumstances; Conduct Reports; Current Privilege Level; Time
Served in current privilege level; Total time spent in Level 5
and/or Level 4; Time left to spend on current sentence; Time
since last incident that resulted in inmate being designated Level
5 or 4; Program Involvement; Behavior in last five years;
including prior to Level 4 or 5 classification; Security level prior
to placement; Adjustment/behavior after placement; Factors
which indicate a risk of future violence; Interaction with others
(staff and/or inmates); Recognition and acknowledgement of the
factors contributing to the commission of the placement offense
and nature; The findings and recommendations of the previous
assessment committees; Previous review committees; and the
findings and recommendations of all assessment committees
subsequent to the placement in Level 4 or 5. Id. at 10-11
51
See MacArthur Justice Center, Supermax Prisons,
http://macarthur.uchicago.edu/supermax/index.html
(finding
that
Supermax prisons exercise control over inmates through extreme social
isolation, severely restricting movement, and environments restricting
stimulation); For a graphical display of the privileges and restrictions on
OSP inmates, see OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17, at 13 (outlining
privileges and restrictions of Level 5 inmates in areas of telephone use,
recreation amounts and facilities, visitation, attorney visits, clergy visits,
library visits, reading materials, meals, hygiene, media and education
programs).
52
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2388 (claiming OSP conditions are
more restrictive than any other form of incarceration in Ohio, including
conditions on its death row or in its administrative control units); See also
OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17, at 13 (comparing privileges of
OSP inmates and non-OSP inmates in areas of telephone use, recreation
amounts and facilities, visitation, attorney visits, clergy visits, library
visits, reading materials, meals, hygiene, media and education programs).
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cells for twenty-three hours a day.53 These single occupancy
cells measure roughly 89.7 square feet and are sealed with a
solid metal door.54 The door contains a small, thick glass
window and a food slot through which all meals are served.55
OSP cells are designed to be highly restrictive, with
minimal amenities and personal items available.56 Each cell
has a “narrow outside window that cannot be opened [and is
smaller than] the square footage standard established by the
American Correctional Association.”57 Inmates have no
control over the temperature of the cells or the circulation of
air through the cell.58 Each cell is scarcely furnished with a
53

See Rachel Kamel and Bonnie Kerness, The Prison Inside the
Prison: Control Units, Supermax Prisons and Devices of Torture, 2
(2003) (explaining that prisoners are confined for twenty-three or twentyfour hours a day, often in what they describe as an “eerie silence”); See
also Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee: Inspection Report,
Nov. 20, 1999, available at http://www.ciic.state.oh.us/publications/osp_
page.html (detailing that inmates are locked in their solid door-front cells
23 hours each day).
54
See Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, supra note
53 (explicating that inmates are locked in their solid door-front cells 23
hours each day).
55
See Kamel, supra note 53, at 2 (detailing how food trays arrive in
small slots in the door to further OSP design for inmates to rarely leave
their cells); See also Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee,
supra note 53 (describing each cell as having a solid-front cell door has
one small, thick glass window and key controlled “food slot” hatch).
56
OSP inmates have no contact visits: prisoners sit behind a
plexiglass window, phone calls and visitation privileges are strictly
limited, books and magazines may be denied and pens restricted, TV and
radios may be prohibited or, if allowed, are controlled by guards.
Prisoners have little or no personal privacy: guards monitor the inmates'
movements by video cameras, communication between prisoners and
control booth officers is mostly through speakers and microphones, an
officer at a control center may be able to monitor cells and corridors and
control all doors electronically. Lynd, supra note 25 (detailing limited
interaction and restricted OSP environment).
57
See Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F.Supp.2d 719, 724 (N.D. Ohio
2002) [hereinafter Austin I] (overturned as to due process analysis but not
as to description of OSP; finding that cell small windows do not comply
with square footage standard established by American Correctional
Association).
58
Id.
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“sink, toilet, small desk, and an immovable stool.”59 Inmates
sleep on a “narrow concrete slab with a thin mattress.”60 The
department strictly limits the amount of personal property
allowed to an inmate.61 Additionally, a light remains on in
the cell at all times.62 Although the light can be dimmed, an
inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to
further discipline.63
OSP inmates are allowed to leave their cell one hour a
day to access a two room recreational area.64 After reviewing
the recreation rooms at OSP, the American Correctional
Association found the facility did not meet the ceiling height
standard and “did not comply with its standards for outdoor
recreation.”65 The solitary recreation policy for all inmates
has recently been changed to allow a limited number of
inmates to have recreation with one other prisoner.66
59

Id.
Id.
61
Id. (finding OSP has extra limitations on personal property rights);
See also Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, OSP Inspection
Report, at 13 (Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.ciic.state.oh. us/reports/osp.pdf
(outlining privileges and personal property restrictions on OSP inmates).
62
Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 724 (explicating that cell light remains
on at all times, although light can be dimmed); See also Kamel, supra
note 53 at 4 (describing that when prisoners are confined in their cells
they are subjected to either an “eerie silence” or constant unpleasant
noise, or by “having lights on twenty-four hours per day.”).
63
Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 724 (explaining how inmates who
attempt to shield cell’s light on 24 hour per day before sleeping is subject
to further discipline).
64
See Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, supra note 53
(detailing how inmates are given one hour of recreation per day at least
five times per week and that inmate movement to recreation area is
conducted by escort of at least two Correctional Officers while inmate is
in full restraints); See also Everett Hoffman, Background on Super
Maximum Security (Supermax) Isolation Units, THE ADVOCATE:
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF KENTUCKY, (Jan. 1999) (detailing
that inmates are allowed one hour of solitary recreation in a concrete
enclosure, but their movements are monitored by video cameras and they
are required to be visually searched by standing naked before control
booth window).
65
See Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 724.
66
Id.
60
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Inmate interaction at OSP is strictly limited.67 OSP
inmates eat alone, exercise alone, and are not allowed to
share books, magazines or other personal property.68 Until the
recent introduction of group counseling sessions, inmates
were not permitted to communicate with others.69 The “group
counseling sessions are conducted by placing inmates in
adjacent bar-fronted cells so that each inmate can see the
counselor and hear the other inmates.”70
III.

THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE IN WILKINSON

In Wilkinson, a class of current and former OSP inmates
filed suit for equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that Ohio’s policy for selecting inmates for incarceration in
OSP violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.71 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
67

For a further description of the limited interaction and restrictive
conditions, see Correctional Institutional Inspection Committee, supra
note 53.
68
See generally OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17, at 13
(outlining privileges and personal property restrictions on OSP inmates);
See generally Kamel, supra note 53.
69
See Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 725;The program booths observed
in the inspection provide the inmates with the opportunity for out of cell
programming and interaction with staff and inmates that otherwise would
not be possible. Programming and counseling is offered in education,
substance abuse, religion, personal and emotional health, and community
service. OSP Inspection Report, supra note 17, at 13 (explicating that
OSP was not designed to accommodate out of cell programming so
potential programming space is extremely limited).
70
See Austin I, 189 F.Supp.2d at 725 n.7 (citing expert testimony
that there was no communication between inmates as “inmates were
almost always being brought out in isolation” and there was no contact
with other inmates except for those situations in housing units where they
could recreate together. Id.).
71
Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2391 (2005) (citing class of
current and former OSP inmates brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against various Ohio prison officials alleging that Ohio’s Old Policy
violated due process); For a discussion on the selection procedures for
OSP placement see infra notes 27-50 and accompanying text (detailing
OSP placement under New Policy); See also 42 U.S.C. §1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
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what process an inmate must be afforded under the Due
Process Clause when he is considered for placement at
OSP.72 The Court concluded that inmates have a protected
liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP.
The

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. Id.
See also U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV §1, which states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Untied
States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
72
Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2386-87 After an eight-day trial, the
District Court found that (1) based on the Supreme Court decision in
Sandin v. Conner, the inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding
assignment to OSP and (2) Ohio denied the inmates due process by failing
to give inmates adequate notice regarding the basis for their incarceration
at OSP and by failing to provide inmates sufficient opportunity to
understand the reasoning and evidence for their retention at OSP. The
Court further found that although Ohio's New Policy provided more
procedural safeguards than its Old Policy, it was nonetheless inadequate
to meet procedural due process requirements. The District Court ordered
extensive substantive and procedural modifications to the policy in an
attempt to narrow the grounds that Ohio could consider in recommending
OSP placement. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's conclusion that the inmates had a liberty interest in
avoiding placement at OSP. The Court also affirmed the District Court's
procedural modifications in their entirety, but set aside the District Court's
far-reaching substantive modifications, holding the modifications
“exceeded the scope of the District Court’s authority.” Id.
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procedures set forth in the New Policy are sufficient to satisfy
the Constitution’s requirements.73
A. Existence of a Liberty Interest
In Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court considered due
process protections of prisoners’ claiming liberty deprivation
under the Due Process Clause.74 The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against
deprivations of life, liberty, and property.75 Those who seek
to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment must establish that one
of the protected interests is at stake.76 A liberty interest can
73

See id. at 2398 (holding that Court of Appeals was correct to find
inmates possessed a liberty interest in avoiding assignment at OSP,
however, lower court was incorrect to sustain procedural modifications);
For an example of the history of prisoners and the Due Process Clause,
see Morrissey v. Brewer, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972) (where the Court
addressed the question of whether due process required a hearing before a
parolee's status could be revoked properly. In discussing for the first time
the liberty interests of convicted prisoners under the new due process
analysis, the Court noted that parolees have a liberty interest in remaining
free from restraint while abiding lawfully by the terms of their parole, and
that the Constitution required due process protection in such a situation.);
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1975) (creating the “statecreated liberty interest doctrine,” for cases in which prisoners claimed a
violation of a liberty interest without due process) (The Court held that
prisoners deserved due process protection in situations where the state had
created a specific entitlement through its statutes and regulations. The
court held that prisoners are deserving of due process sufficient to “insure
that the state-created right [was] not arbitrarily abrogated.” Id.); See also
Meachum v. Fano, 97 S.Ct. 191 (1976) (This case held that prison
officials had absolute authority to make decisions concerning where to
house convicted prisoners and when to transfer prisoners from prison to
prison, as long as objective law did not grant prisoners rights limiting
such official discretion and found that, unless a deprivation of liberty
within prison could be tied to the Constitution itself, only the loss of a
specific state-created liberty interest would entitle a prisoner to protection
under the Due Process Clause.).
74
See infra notes 84-127 and accompanying text.
75
U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV 1.
76
The “consideration of a due process claim goes through two steps.
First, the Court asks whether a liberty or property interest exists with
which the state has interfered. Second, the Court determines whether the
§
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be created within the Constitution itself, by reason of
guarantees implicit in the word “liberty” or from an
expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.77
1. Sandin v. Conner
The issue of whether the Due Process Clause requires
prisons to establish formal procedures in its administration of
discipline is not a new issue for the Supreme Court.78 In
Sandin, the Court addressed the legal standards that courts
apply in considering prisoner claims of liberty deprivation
under the Due Process Clause.79 Specifically, Sandin
required the Court to determine whether an inmate had been
deprived of his due process rights when Hawaii prison
officials selected the inmate for placement in solitary
confinement for thirty days without a formal selection
procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally
sufficient.” Austin v. Wilkinson, Case No. 4:01-CV-71 (ND Ohio,
November 21, 2001).
77
See, e.g., Wolff, 94 S.Ct. at 2963 (1974) (finding liberty interest in
avoiding withdrawal of state-created system of good-time credits).
78
See infra notes 84-127 and accompanying text; See Meachum v.
Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976) (history of prior Supreme Court holdings
considering inmates’ liberty interests and due process) (finding there was
no liberty interest arising from Due Process Clause inherent in transfers
from low to maximum-security prison because “confinement in any of the
State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which
the conviction has authorized the State to impose”). See also Kentucky
Dept of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1989) (holding that no
procedures need accompany suspension of visitation privileges); See also
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). See also Wolff, 94 S. Ct. at
2963 (holding that states may under certain circumstances create liberty
interests which are protected by Due Process Clause, but these interests
will “be limited to restraints on freedom which impose ‘atypical and
significant hardship on inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison
life’” and concluding that due process applies prior to revocation of good
time credits.). See also Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 370, 378-81
(1987) (concluding that due process applies to denial of parole); See also
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 461, 471-72 (1983) (finding that due process
applies prior to administrative segregation).
79
See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2293 (involving a procedural due process
protection claim before placement in segregated confinement for thirty
days, imposed as discipline for disruptive behavior).
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procedure.80
The Court altered its methodology for
determining when such formal procedures are required and
found the inmate’s due process rights had not been violated.81
Under the Court’s new methodology, prison officials acting
in violation of specific regulations often gives rise to a liberty
interest worthy of procedural due process protection.82
Prior to Sandin, courts relied heavily on state statutes and
prison rules in cases involving questions of prisoner’s
procedural due process rights.83 According to Sandin, the
80

Id. at 2301-02 (the Court held that the prisoner's “discipline in
segregated confinement [for thirty days] did not present the type of
atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create
a liberty interest.” The segregated confinement did not “present a
dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate’s] sentence,”
as inmates in the general population experienced “significant amounts of
‘lockdown time’” and the severity of confinement in disciplinary
segregation was not excessive. Id. at 2301.); See id. (holding that states
may under certain circumstances create liberty interests that are protected
by the Due Process Clause.)
81
See id. at 2300; See also Scott F. Weisman, Sandin v. Conner:
Lowering the Boom on the Procedural Rights or Prisoners, 46 AM. U.L.
REV. 897, 909 (citing Kentucky Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S.
454, 462-63 (1989) (claiming that before Sandin, Supreme Court
recognized state-created liberty interests when a statute or prison
regulation contained: (1) substantive predicates or specific criteria to
guide prison officials in deciding whether to alter conditions or length of
inmates’ confinement; and (2) mandatory language, earmarked with
words such as “shall” or “must,” permitting adverse change in
confinement only if substantive predicates were met)).
82
Michael Z. Goldman, Sandin v. Conner and Intraprison
Confinement: Ten Years of Confusion and Harm in Prisoner Litigation,
45 B.C. L. REV 423, 425 (2004) (noting that for twenty years prior to
Sandin, Supreme Court recognized that prisoners possessed liberty
interests protected by Due Process Clause if prisoners could point to
specific state or federally created right that prison officials had violated).
83
See Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2408 (2005) (citing
Sandin, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (noting earlier Supreme Court cases had
employed methodologies for identifying state-created liberty interests that
emphasized “the language of a particular [prison] regulation” instead of
“nature of the deprivation” Id.)); See also Weisman, supra note 81, at 909
(citing Kentucky Dept of Corr., 490 U.S. at 462-63 (explaining that before
Sandin Supreme Court recognized state-created liberty interests when a
statute or prison regulation contained: (1) substantive predicates or
specific criteria to guide prison officials in deciding whether to alter
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proper inquiry should focus on whether a violation caused an
“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 84 The Sandin Court
shifted due process analysis to the severity of the proposed
punishment when it held that formal procedures are required
for those punishments that pose an “atypical and significant
hardship” on the inmate.85 In determining whether the
conditions of the inmate’s confinement constitute an
“atypical and significant hardship,” courts must consider the
nature of the restrictive conditions themselves “in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.”86 Under the new

conditions or length of inmate's confinement and (2) mandatory language,
earmarked with words such as “shall” or “must,” permitting an adverse
change in confinement only if substantive predicates were met)).
84
Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2300 (holding prior analysis focused on
finding “negative implications from mandatory language in prisoner
regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause” in attempts to return to due process
principles established in Wolff and Meachum. Id.).
85
See id. at 2301-02 (illustrating that after Sandin, courts inquired
into “existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding
restrictive conditions of confinement is not found in regulation language
regarding those conditions but in nature of those conditions themselves in
relation to ordinary incidents of prison life” Id.); See also Julia M.
Glencer, An ‘Atypical and Significant’ Barrier to Prisoners’ Procedural
Due Process Claims Based on State-Created Liberty Interests, 100 DICK.
L. REV. 861, 894 (disapproving of prior methodologies because of two
undesirable effects resulting from its application). The prior methodology
was resulting in two undesirable effects from its application:
First, states were reluctant to codify guidelines for prison
management for fear of creating liberty interests that invited
litigation. Supreme Court precedent under Hewitt actually
militated against written standards, even though guidelines
were sorely needed to moderate prison officials' unbridled
discretion. Second, the use of the old methodology drew
federal courts into daily prison administration.
The
traditional leeway given prison officials in maintaining order
inside the country's prisons had been usurped by the courts.
Id.
86
See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2296 (describing how states may create
liberty interests, when “atypical and significant hardship [would be borne
by] the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” Id.).
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methodology, the Court found thirty days of solitary
confinement was not an “atypical and significant hardship.”87
In Wilkinson, the Court applied the Sandin methodology
to determine whether the harsh conditions within OSP
imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” that created a
liberty interest in avoiding placement to OSP.88 The Court
noted, despite the severe limitations on human interaction,
OSP’s conditions would likely be similar to most solitary
confinement facilities and not be an “atypical or significant
hardship.”89
The Court found, however, there were two additional
restrictions placed on OSP inmates, which increased the
amount of hardship beyond the normal course of prison
confinement.90 First, the duration of placement at OSP was
indefinite and only reviewed annually.91 Second, placement
87

See id. at 2300 (noting court record showed that solitary
punishment, was similar to conditions imposed upon inmates in
administrative segregation and protective custody and that inmates in
general populations experienced “significant amounts of ‘lockdown
time’” and degree of confinement in disciplinary segregation was not
excessive).
88
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2394 (reasoning that Sandin standard
required courts “to determine if assignment to OSP ‘imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life’” Id.); To determine whether the inmate has endured an
atypical and significant hardship, courts must compare the conditions of
confinement in the Supermax facility to those an inmate would ordinarily
expect in prison.
See Maximilienne Bishop, Supermax Prisons:
Increasing Security or Permitting Persecution?, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 461.
(2005) (explaining that in determining if liberty interests exist, courts
must find that conditions constitute “atypical and significant hardship” on
inmates).
89
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2394 (noting that for OSP inmates,
almost all human contact is prohibited, even cell to cell conversation; cell
lights are on for 24 hours and only one hour of exercise in small indoor
rooms is permitted per day).
90
Id. (holding that OSP conditions would likely apply to most
solitary confinement facilities, except for two added components:
duration and that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for
parole consideration).
91
See id. at 2394-2395 (noting that unlike 30-day placement at issue
in Sandin, placement at OSP is indefinite and, after OSP’s initial 30-day
review, is reviewed just annually).
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in OSP disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole
consideration.92 The Court acknowledged the disagreement
among the Courts of Appeals as to the proper baseline to
define an “atypical or significant hardship.”93 The Wilkinson
Court opted not to resolve the disagreement as the Court
found, under any plausible baseline, the OSP’s harsh
conditions imposed an “atypical and significant hardship”
within the correctional context which creates a liberty interest
in avoiding placement to OSP.94
B. How Much Process is Due? The Mathews v.
Eldridge Test
Having found the existence of a liberty interest, the
Wilkinson Court turned to the question of what due process is
due to an inmate that Ohio seeks to place in OSP.95 The
Court noted that because the proper procedural protections
depend on the nature of the particular situation, the
requirements of due process are flexible.96 In evaluating the
sufficiency of Ohio’s selection procedure, the Court

92

See id. at 2395 (finding that OSP placement disqualifies an
otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration is unlike restrictions in
Sandin.)
93
See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2300; See also Wagner v. Hanks, 128
F.3d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining this divergence indicates
difficulties in locating appropriate baselines, however, need not be
resolved as assignment to OSP imposes an atypical and significant
hardship under any plausible baseline).
94
See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2300 (noting that despite Ohio's interest
in decreasing dangerous high-risk inmates on both prison officials and
other prisoners, under Sandin‘s standard, OSP’s harsh conditions impose
atypical and significant hardships within correctional context that creates
inmate liberty interest in avoiding placement to OSP.)
95
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2395 (explicating that since inmate
liberty interest in avoiding OSP has been established, inquiry now turns
Sic. to question of what process is due inmates whom Ohio seeks to place
in OSP).
96
See id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972))
(declining to establish rigid rules and instead embraced a flexible
framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular procedures).
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continued the framework established in Mathews v.
Eldridge.97
1. Mathews v. Eldridge
In Mathews, the Supreme Court created a three prong
balancing test to determine the proper amount of due process
required under a particular set of facts and circumstances.98
In determining that no evidentiary hearing is required before
termination of disability benefits and that present
administrative procedures fully satisfy due process
guarantees, the Court expounded the three due process
factors.99 The Court’s balancing test required the
consideration of:
First, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional
or
substitute
procedural
100
requirement would entail.
97

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. (determining whether Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment
provides opportunities for evidentiary hearings to Social Security
disability benefit recipient prior to termination of his benefits).
99
Id. at 336 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)) (holding unsatisfied
worker must provide medical assessments of physical or mental
conditions stating that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment” Id.); See also Matthew Q. Ammon, Constitutional Law—
Procedural Due Process—Employment—Suspension—State Employees,
36 DUQ. L. REV. 951, 957 (1998) (explaining Court found small risk of
wrongful deprivation under facts while government’s interest was great in
avoiding increased costs associated with hearings prior to termination of
benefits and required payments while decisions are pending).
100
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2395 (addressing nature and extent of
hearing procedures that are required to protect against erroneous or
98

2007

Supermax Kryptonite

247

In applying the three factors set forth in Mathews, the
Supreme Court found Ohio’s New Policy provides a
sufficient level of process for Ohio inmates being considered
for placement in OSP.101 Under the first Mathews factor, the
Court considered the significance of the Ohio inmate’s
interest in avoiding improper placement at OSP.102 The
Court noted that lawfully confined prisoners have their
liberties curtailed, so the proper amount of procedural
protections afforded to inmates are more limited than in cases
where the right to be free from total confinement is at
stake.103 Here, the inmate’s private liberty interest is at stake
arbitrary deprivation of any property interest and “recognizing that at
some point the costs of additional procedural safeguards may outweigh
their benefits” Id.); See also Matthew J. Macario, Recent Decisions:
Constitutional Law—Punitive Damage Awards and Procedural Due
Process in Products Liability Cases, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 409, 414 (1995)
(stating Mathews test requires “utilitarian balancing of the interests at
stake: When the private interest is not outweighed by the government’s
interest in preserving its procedural framework, procedural due process is
satisfied” Id.); See also Bradley J. Wyatt, Even Aliens Are Entitled to Due
Process: Extending Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing to Board of
Immigration Appeals Procedural Reforms, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
606 (2004) (explaining Mathews’ Court created a balancing test to
determine whether administrative procedures conform to procedural due
process laws. In order to determine what process is due, the Court called
for “a balancing of private interests, the probable value of additional safe
guards, and the government interest, including the cost of the procedure.”
Id.).
101
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2395 (Supreme Court rejected the
District Court’s procedural modifications by finding the court improperly
found that Sandin altered the first Mathews factor and increased the
amount of due process protection required under the balancing test.
Because the Sandin Court found there was no liberty interest at stake,
“Sandin had no occasion to consider whether the private interest was
weighty vis-à-vis the remaining Mathews factors.” Id.).
102
See generally id.; see also David Kauffman, Procedures for
Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 153, 165 (1982) (detailing that “to estimate the risk of an
erroneous deprivation, courts must make intuitive judgments as to
whether the procedures at issue will yield an accurate result” Id.).
103
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2395 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975)); See also Wolff v. McDonald, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1975)
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and must be considered within the norms of the prison system
and its infringement on the liberty of inmates.104
The second factor focuses on the “fairness and reliability”
of the existing procedures, and the “probable value, if any, of
additional procedural safeguards.”105 Supreme Court
procedural due process cases have consistently observed that
notice and a fair opportunity for rebuttal are among the most
important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding
erroneous deprivations.106 The Mathews Court noted that
Ohio’s New Policy provides for an inmate to receive both
procedural requirements before being placed in OSP.107 In
addition to these safeguards, the Court noted Ohio’s New
Policy provided further requirements that reduced the
possibility of an erroneous OSP placement.108 The New
Policy: (1) allows inmates the opportunity to be heard at the
Classification Committee stage and affords inmates the right
to submit objections prior to the final level of review; (2)
allows a subsequent reviewer to overturn a recommendation
for placing an inmate in OSP and mandates the termination of
the selection process if any one reviewer does not
(noting that prisoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty
curtailed by definition, so procedural protections to which they are
entitled are more limited than in cases where questioned right is to be free
from confinement completely).
104
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2395 (holding “the private interest at
stake here, while more than minimal, must be evaluated, nonetheless,
within the context of the prison system and its attendant curtailment of
liberties” Id.).
105
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
106
See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979); See also Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985); See also Fuentes v. Shevin,
92 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223 (1864)
(explicating that “for more than a century the central meaning of
procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that
right they must first be notified’” Id.).
107
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2396 (noting Ohio’s New Policy
required officials to provide brief summaries of factual basis for inmate’s
review and allows prisoners rebuttal opportunity implemented to prevent
placement of inmates in OSP by mistake or bias).
108
Id.
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recommend OSP placement; (3) requires that a final
recommendation for placement in OSP be accompanied by a
short statement of the reasons from the decision maker and
(4) provides a review of the prisoner’s placement “within
thirty days of the inmate's initial assignment to OSP.”109
The final, and most influential, Mathews factor addresses
the State’s interest.110 With Ohio’s prison population
reaching nearly 44,000 inmates, “the State’s first obligation
must be to ensure the safety of the guards and the prison
personnel, the public, and the prisoners themselves.”111 The
State’s interest in maintaining prison security is threatened by
the persistence of prison gangs and violence.112 Prison gangs
routinely engage in acts of violence as a means of gang
discipline and control, as membership rituals, or as
punishment against inmates who have testified against the
gang.113
109

Id. (explaining that “this requirement guards against arbitrary
decision making while also providing the inmate a basis for objection
before the next decision maker or in a subsequent classification review”
and “serves as a guide for future behavior” and finding that subsequent
reviewer’s ability to overturn recommendations for placing inmates in
OSP “avoids one of problems apparently present under the Old Policy,
where, even if two levels of reviewers recommended against placement, a
later reviewer could overturn their recommendation without explanation”
Id.).
110
Id. (finding that in “the context of prison management, and in the
specific circumstances of this case, this interest is a dominant
consideration” Id.).
111
Id. (citing Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2002));
See also id. at 2397(citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 461, 473 (1983)
(noting “the safety of the institution's guards and inmates is perhaps the
most fundamental responsibility of the prison administration.” Hewitt,
459 U.S. at 473).
112
Id. at 2396 (noting gangs are “clandestine, organized, fueled by
race-based hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a means of
disciplining their own members and their rivals” and “seek nothing less
than to control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls”
Id.).
113
Id. at 2396-97(detailing that murder of inmates, guards, or one of
their family members on the outside is common form of gang discipline
and control, as well as condition for membership in some gangs;
testifying against, or otherwise informing on, gang activities can invite
one's own death sentence; and prison gang members serving life
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The State also has an interest in the efficient allocation of
limited prison funding.114 The high cost of the State’s
penitentiary system makes it difficult to fund more effective
education and vocational assistance programs to improve the
lives of the prisoners.115 The Supreme Court noted, in
Wilkinson, that courts must give “substantial deference to
prison management decisions before mandating additional
expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards”116 when
correctional officials have determined that an inmate has been
involved in disruptive behavior.117 In light of these economic
constraints, the Court rejected the District Court’s
recommendation that inmates should be allowed to call
witnesses at their OSP selection hearings.118
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that after balancing
the three Mathews factors, Ohio’s New Policy in selecting
sentences, without possibility of parole, have diminished deterrent
effects); See also United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir.
1995) (involving inmate gang members’ being required to kill someone in
prison before the inmate could become member of Mexican Mafia prison
gang); See also United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1341 (7th Cir.
1984) (explaining that to qualify for membership in Aryan Brotherhood
prison gang you must “make bones”— or kill somebody and detailing that
Aryan Brotherhood and Mexican Mafia are allied, among other things in
their hostility to black inmates, who have their own gangs.).
114
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2397; See also Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction, The Institutions, http://www.drc.state.oh.us
/Public/osp.htm (outlining OSP’s annual operating budget of
$28,595,868).
115
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2397 (noting cost of keeping single
prisoner in Ohio's ordinary maximum-security prisons is $34,167 per
year, while cost to maintain each inmate at OSP is $49,007 per year).
116
Id. at 2388
117
Id. (holding that State's interest must be considered in light of
State’s limited resources and if Ohio were to allow inmates “to call
witnesses or provide other attributes of an adversary hearing before
ordering transfer to OSP, both the State's immediate objective of
controlling the prisoner and its greater objective of controlling the prison
could be defeated” Id.).
118
Id. at 2397 (explaining that altering New Policy to permit calling
witnesses is both economically infeasible and “the danger to witnesses,
and the difficulty in obtaining their cooperation, make the probable value
of an adversary-type hearing doubtful in comparison to its obvious costs”
Id.).
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inmates for OSP provided enough safeguards to insure
against arbitrary assignment.119 The Court noted that when
the inquiry “draws more on the experience of prison
administrators, and where the State’s interest implicates the
safety of other inmates and prison personnel, the informal,
non-adversary procedures”120 applied provide the proper
methodology.121 Ohio’s New Policy provides “informal,
non-adversary procedures” sufficient to satisfy the due
process clause under the Mathews test and no further
procedural modifications were necessary.122
IV.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WILKINSON OPINION

In balancing the Mathews factors in Wilkinson, the Court
found that inmates’ private interests in avoiding placement
into OSP did not outweigh the government's interest in
maintaining an orderly and safe penitentiary system.123

119

Id. at 2398 (holding balance of the Mathews factors reveals that
Ohio's New Policy is adequate to safeguard inmate liberty interests in not
being assigned to OSP); See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 92 S. Ct. 2593
(1972) (finding Ohio is not attempting to remove inmates from free
society for specific parole violation or to revoke good time credits for
specific, serious misbehavior); See also Wolff v. McDonald, 94 S. Ct.
2963 (1975) (involving more formal, adversary-type procedures as
useful).
120
Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2397 (discussing Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)).
121
See, e.g., Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1 (holding that the amount of
process due for inmates being considered for release on parole includes
opportunity to be heard and notice of any adverse decision); See also
Hewit v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (finding amount of process due for
inmates being considered for transfer to administrative segregation
includes some notice of charges and opportunity to be heard).
122
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2397 (rejecting District Court and
Court of Appeals order to alter New Policy).
123
See generally id. (holding that in applying Mathews three factors,
Ohio's New Policy demonstrates it provides sufficient level of process);
for a contrary balance of the Mathews factors, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985) (finding government’s interest in
limiting administrative burdens and delays, did not outweigh private
interests even though government has interest in avoiding disruptions in
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Inmates’ interests were considered under the first factor of
the Mathews test, which weighs the “private interest that will
be affected by the official action.” 124 The Court’s opinion,
however, focuses on the second and third Mathews’ factors,
hardly discussing the inmates’ individual interests, thereby
tipping the balance in favor of Ohio.125 Traditionally, when
determining the weight of the threatened individual interest,
courts consider four major criteria: the severity of the
deprivation, the duration of deprivation, the reversibility of
the deprivation, and the access of claimants to private
alternatives.126 In the Wilkinson due process analysis under
the Mathews test, the Court did not discuss any of these
criteria.127
Additionally, in determining the weight of an inmate’s
interest in avoiding OSP selection, the Court chose not to
its workplace, as it is better to keep skilled employees than to train new
replacements).
124
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 335, 335 (1976); see also
Macario, supra note 100, at 414 and accompanying text (stating Mathews
test requires “utilitarian balancing of the interests at stake: When the
private interest is not outweighed by the government's interest in
preserving its procedural framework, procedural due process is satisfied”
Id.).
125
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2384.
126
For a discussion on the severity of the property deprivation see
Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 n.3 (1978); For a discussion
on the duration of the deprivation see Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 12
(1979) (describing that “duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation
of a property interest is an important factor in assessing the impact of
official action on the private interest involved”); see also North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); see also
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975); For a discussion on
reversibility of deprivation, see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340 (1976)
(explicating that availability of full retroactive relief for recipient whose
social security benefits were wrongfully terminated greatly influenced
Court's decision); see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)
(detailing that it is impossible to recompense driver for lost time during
which driver could not drive and for resulting burdens on performance of
his duties due to improperly revoked license); for a discussion on the
access of claimants to private alternatives see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342
(1976) (terminating disability recipient has the “possibility of access” to
private resources or welfare assistance.).
127
See generally Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct at 2394.
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discuss the physical and mental consequences of placement
into OSP.128 A number of psychological studies have been
conducted which indicate that the isolation and lack of
activity within Supermax facilities leads to mental health
problems with its inmates.129 By ignoring the potentially
hazardous mental health effects of Supermax facilities, the
Supreme Court chose to exclude a relevant component of the
first Mathews factor.130
Professional research indicates that inmates subjected to
long-term solitary confinement have an increased risk of
developing potentially serious psychiatric problems.131 The
high rate of mental health problems in the general prison
population is exacerbated by the extreme isolation of
supermax inmates.132 As greater restrictions and social
deprivations are placed on inmates, their levels of social
128

Id.
For a history of inmate isolation studies see Hans Toch, The
Future of Supermax Confinement, 81 PRISON J. 376, 376-88 (2001)
(finding “early U.S. experiments with isolation in Pennsylvania and New
York in the 1800s demonstrated the severe impact that isolation has on
inmates’ psychological and physical health” resulting in “prison
administrators quickly abandoned solitary confinement as a general
correctional tool and used isolation as only a temporary form of
punishment.” Id.).
130
See Mathews, 424 U.S. 319; see also infra note 131 and
accompanying text (outlining traditional Supreme Court considerations in
determining proper weight of threatened individual interest).
131
See Stanley Brodsky & Forrest R. Scogin, Inmates in Protective
Custody: First Data on Emotional Effects, 1 FORENSIC REP. 267 (1988);
see also Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary
Confinement, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1983); see also Stuart
Grassian and Nancy Friedman, Effects of Sensory Deprivation in
Psychiatric Seclusion and Solitary Confinement, 8 INT’L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 49 (1986); see also Holly A. Miller, Reexamining
Psychological Distress in the Current Conditions of Segregation, 1 J.
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 39 (1994); see also Scott, G. and Paul
Gendreau, Psychiatric Implications of Sensory Deprivation in a Maximum
Security Prison, 14 CANADIAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC. J. 337 (1969).
132
See generally Paula M. Ditton, Mental Health and Treatment of
Inmates and Probationers, U.S. Dept. of Justice Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 1999, available at http://www.ojp.usdog.gov/bjs/pub/
ascii/mhtip.txt.
129
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withdrawal and psychological problems dramatically
increase.133
The psychological effects on supermax inmates can
manifest in varying mental disorders.134 Specifically, recent
studies suggest that the added restrictions of inmate isolation
and segregation result in depression, hostility, severe anger,
sleep disturbances, physical symptoms, and anxiety among
inmates.135 Isolation can produce emotional damage, declines
in mental functioning, depersonalization, hallucinations, and
delusions.136 Inmates in isolation also suffer from numerous
physical symptoms, such as perceptual changes, difficulties
in thinking, concentration and memory problems, and
problems with impulse control.137 Interviews with inmates in
high-security facilities have demonstrated similar findings.138
133

Imposing more restrictions without appropriate activity
programming is detrimental to inmates’ health and rehabilitative
prognoses. Potentially beneficial programming includes educational,
recreational, and psychological services. See Jesenia Pizarro and Vanja
M.K. Stenius, Supermax Prisons: Their Rise, Current Practices, and
Effects on
Inmates, 84
PRISON J. 248, available at
http://tpj.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/84/2/248 (claiming that “increasing
inmates’ restrictions by limiting human contact, autonomy, goods, or
services requires more intense activity programming to counteract the
adverse effects of these restrictions” Id.).
134
For a discussion on the various mental disorders found within
Supermax inmates, see Lynd, supra note 25.
135
See Pizarro, supra note 131 (citing Brodsky, supra note 129; also
citing Miller, supra note 129) (noting that although “types of restrictions
and outcomes measured vary across studies, the general consensus is that
increasing the level of restrictions increases the risk for psychological and
emotional problems.” Id.)
136
See generally Brodsky, supra note 129; see also Grassian, supra
note 129. See also Miller, supra note 129. See also Scott, supra note
129.
137
See generally Brodsky, supra note 129. See also Grassian, supra
note 129; see also Grassian & Friedman, supra note 129. See also Miller,
supra note 129.
138
These inferences about the impact of these facilities on inmates’
mental and physical health are based primarily on research examining the
effects of temporary solitary confinement or administrative segregation
within regular prisons. The differences in the scope of restrictions and
deprivations, as well as the duration of the isolation, have the potential of
increasing the adverse effects. Clearly, spending a specified number of
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In particular, one study found that women living in a highsecurity unit experienced claustrophobia, chronic rage
reaction, depression, hallucinatory symptoms, defensive
psychological withdrawal and apathy.139
Although neglected by the Court in Wilkinson, the
potentially hazardous mental health effect of Supermax
facilities is a relevant component of the first Mathews
factor.140 Under the first Mathews factor, the inmate’s
interest in avoiding placement at OSP—the inmates’ interest
in avoiding an environment that is potentially physically
dangerous—should be considered.141 Although it is true that
lawfully confined prisoners have curtailed liberties and less
procedural protections, evidence that supermax inmates
suffer from increased mental problems strengthens the
argument that further procedural safeguards are necessary.142
As stated in Wilkinson, an inmate’s private liberty interest
is at stake and must be considered within the norms of the
prison system and its infringement on the liberty of
inmates.143 Research indicates greater health problems are
placed on supermax inmates as compared to those of normal
days in isolation is quite different from serving the remainder of one’s
sentence, possibly years, in a Supermax facility. Similarly, spending 23
hours a day in isolation with no activities is not comparable to spending
23 hours a day in isolation with meaningful activities. See Pizarro, supra
note 131.
139
See also Grassian, supra note 129 (attributing these problems to
factors such as “depersonalization, the denial of individuality, the denial
of personal initiative, and humiliation” Id.).
140
See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See
also supra note 129 and accompanying text (outlining traditional Supreme
Court considerations in determining proper weight of threatened
individual interest).
141
For a discussion on the first Mathews factors see David Kauffman,
Procedures for Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in
Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1982) (detailing that “to estimate the
risk of an erroneous deprivation, courts must make intuitive judgments as
to whether the procedures at issue will yield an accurate result” Id.).
142
See id.
143
Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2395 (2005) (holding that
“the private interest at stake here, while more than minimal, must be
evaluated, nonetheless, within the context of the prison system and its
attendant curtailment of liberties” Id.).
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prison inmates.144 Due to the possibility that an OSP inmate
will become mentally unhealthy, those pending placement
have a greater liberty interest in avoiding OSP placement
than placement in a standard prison.145
From the Court’s unanimous decision in Wilkinson, it is
clear that the severe conditions and adverse effects on OSP
inmates’ do not outweigh Ohio’s interest in maintaining an
orderly and safe penitentiary system.146 It is not clear
whether more due process would be owed to inmates under
the Mathews test if the negative health effects of OSP inmates
were considered.147 If the Court had considered the adverse
mental effects of OSP in its application of the Mathews
balancing test, perhaps it would have been less inclined to
find that the “fairness and reliability” of the existing
procedure provided sufficient procedural safeguards.148
V.

WILKINSON DECISION’S NATIONAL IMPACT

Wilkinson had an impact on Ohio’s New Policy for OSP
inmate selection because it can now continue to operate under
its current procedures.149
However, the larger, more
important, impact of the Court’s decision is Ohio’s New
Policy will be used as a guide for states to follow regarding
their Supermax prisons.150
The positive impact of the Wilkinson ruling will be the
implementation of constitutionally permissible selection
procedures for Supermax prisons that will decrease the
number of wrongful and arbitrary inmate placements.151
Additionally, the use of Supermax prisons will facilitate the
penal systems obligation to ensure the safety of guards,
144

See id. at 2396.
See id.
146
See id.
147
See id.
148
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976); see also
Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2396.
149
See generally Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2396.
150
See generally id.
151
See generally id.
145
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prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners.152 Through
the proper use of Supermax facilities, the threat of persistent
prison gang violence will have a diminished effect on the
state’s interest in maintaining prison security.153
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s Wilkinson decision,
rejecting the due process challenges of Supermax prisoners, it
is likely that additional Supermax facilities will be
constructed throughout the country. As professional research
indicates, inmates subjected to long-term solitary
confinement have an increased risk of developing potentially
serious psychiatric conditions.154 This may impede the
prisoner rehabilitation process and lead to problems in society
from mentally effected inmates released from Supermax
prisons.155 Additionally, the Court attempted to narrow its
holding by citing the specific procedural safeguards
implemented in Ohio’s New Policy.156 However, because the
Court was unanimous in its upholding of the New Policy,
some states may choose to provide fewer procedural
safeguards than the Ohio New Policy.157 At such an early
stage, it remains to be seen how the Wilkinson holding will
impact Supermax prisons, state’s prison selection procedures,
and inmates. But for now it remains clear: Terry Nichols,
Theodore Kaczynski, Lee Boyd Malvo, John Allen
Muhammed, and Eric Robert Rudolph will continue to call a
supermax prison home for a very long time.158
152

See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 461(1983) (discussing “the safety
of the institution’s guards and inmates is perhaps the most fundamental
responsibility of the prison administration” Id.).
153
See Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2397 (noting gangs are disruptive,
functioning as “clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and
committed to fear and violence as a means of disciplining their own
members and their rivals” and “seek nothing less than to control prison
life and to extend their power outside prison walls” Id.).
154
See sources cited supra note 129, and accompanying text.
155
See supra note 136, and accompanying text (indicating that
inmates subjected to long term solitary confinement have increased risk of
developing potentially serious psychiatric problems).
156
See generally Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2396.
157
See generally id.
158
See generally Supermax Prisons and the Constitution, supra note 2.
See also Riveland, supra note 1.

